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Two Views of Non-Voting: A Critique
STEPHEN L. WASBY
Sowhern Illinois University, Carbondale
ABSTRACT - The view that non-voting is bad is contrasted with the view that non-voting can be
functional for a political system. Works by Schattschneider and Berelson et al. are examined.
Limitations in their arguments are pointed out, particularly the farmer's assertion that non-voters
are being manipulated and the letters' emphasis on the short-run aspects of the system. The
arguments are related to traditional conceptions of democracy.

This paper is an attempt to examine some views of the
phenomenon of non-voting in the United States. The
views of two political scientists who assumed what are
essentiaUy opposing positions on the value of non-voting
were chosen for examination. In addition, one represented a traditional approach to the subject and the
other, a more sociological or "behavioral" position. The
two writers are E. E. Schattschneider and Bernard Berelson; their arguments are abstracted from The Semi-Sovereign People (1960) and Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld,
and McPhee, 1954), respectively. This paper is principally a review essay and critique, not a presentation of
new data, although hopefully the analysis may stimulate
some new explorations of non-voting.
In their discussions of non-voting and its consequences, both Schattschneider and Berelson et al. were
concerned with the ability of democratic political systems to cope with problems created by internal system
frictions and the external political environment. Each
discussed at length the implications of the high rate of
non-voting in the United States. While more or less concerned with the same problem, the two evaluated nonvoting in quite different ways. Schattschneider basica1Iy
said it is "bad," or at least "not good," while Berelson
indicated that non-voting (at least within certain unspecified limits, or unaccompanied by complete dissatisfaction with the system) can be, and is, functional for the
democratic system. Both agreed that there is "unused political potential" within the system. They disagreed , however, on whether it should be used and, if so, when and
how.
The Basic Views

Schattschneider began his argument by distinguishing
between the roughly 60 million voters and the 40 million
non-voters, asserting that a curtain, although a "tissuepaper curtain," separates the two groups. Assuming that
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the two groups differ considerably in political leaning, he
argued that "the addition of forty million voters ( or any
major fraction of them) would make a tremendous difference" ( Schattschneider, 1960: 103) in the world of
politics. Schattschneider continually emphasized the
"blackout of the forty million," which shows the "profound contradiction between theory and practice" in
democracy. This non-participation is the "sickness of democracy." Although at one point he said that non-voting
seems to be "voluntary," he later argued predominantly
that non-voters are excluded from participation by invisible processes.
In the past, he wrote, the expansion of the electorate
was a function of party conflict and a result of changes
in public policy. Now the struggle had ceased to be over
the right to vote; it was, rather, over the "organization
of politics." The latter is quite important to meaningful
politics, Schattschneider said, because, even though the
formal right to vote is given, the vote can be made quite
meaningless through the existence of obstacles to organization of the electorate. If the non-voting 40 million are
to be made participants, a new political system "based
on new cleavages and about something new" is necessary.
What makes the present division between the nonvoter and the voter critical is that in effect they make up
two communities; the social "haves" and political
"haves" coincide, as do the social and political "havenots." For Schattschneider, the 40 million are not in the
same contest with the 60 million; the political organization of today is only the political organization of the 60
million. Nor should we be misled by the existence of conflict; we have concentrated attention on the cleavage
within the 60 million to the exclusion of the cleavage between the two communities. Since support for a major
shift in policy exists only outside the present electorate,
this omission is a major flaw.
Berelson's prime concern was that the political theory
of democracy accord with present democratic practice
( see Almond and Verba, 1963: 4 7 5-6). He noted several assumptions in democratic theory, such as political
discussion and strong citizen motivation to participate in
politics and to be well informed (cf. Davis, 1964). He
compared these assumptions with findings of empirical
research about voting behavior, for example, that we talk
rather than debate, have weak motivation to participate,
and have low levels of political information.
His basic thesis was that, while individual voters do
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not satisfy the requirements of democratic political
theory, the total membership of the political system does.
The theory, Berelson said, has been "defective in its concentration on the individual citizen" (Berelson et al.,
1954: 312) and it has demanded that citizens possess
characteristics such as rationality and awareness in too
extreme a form. A functioning political system requires
more than participant voters; stability must be assured
and conflict must be restrained at the same time that
change occurs. The conflicting requirements of adjustment
and stability, of conflict and consensus, can be met by a
distribution of characteristics among the population, rather than by possession by any one individual ( or all individuals) of all necessary characteristics ( see Almond
and Verba, 1963: 479).
In these terms, the least desirable voters according to
the requirements of classical democratic theory may be
helpful in the resolution of political problems through
low political involvement, which facilitates their changing policy position and party preference. Those who
vote least often, who are most erratic and perhaps least
motivated when they do participate, may nonetheless be
quite helpful to the system's functioning by contributing
flexibility. As Glaser ( 1962) pointed out, "Under some
conditions a successful presidential candidate may break
even or perhaps lose among the politically more alert
voters, while winning his majority from the ballots of the
less interested" (p. 47).
One of Berelson's conclusions was that we need to accept the existence of a political division of labor, as
much as we accept an economic or social one. Some perform regular participant tasks with stable, consistent
views and others perform irregularly with inconsistent,
unstable views. The non-voter, then, is not an unmitigated evil. In addition, Berelson suggested that a relatively low voting rate shows that the society has ways
other than the political to resolve its conflicts-that not
too much stress and strain is being placed on politics to
solve the society's problems. In Almond's and Verba's
(1963:475) terms, "The maintenance of other orientations limits the extent of his commitment to political activity and keeps politics, as it were, in its place."
Further Views, Criticism and Comment
Schattschneider was not completely clear on the reasons for the existence of such a large segment of what
Merriam and Gosnell ( 1934) called "habitual non-voters" in the population. The burden of his argument
about the need for a change in the agenda of politics was
that the non-voters are "least involved or most convinced
the system is loaded" against them, and are the "soft underbelly of the system," the "most likely point of subversion" (Schattschneider, 1960:104). We are "very
near," he said, "to something like the limit of tolerance
of passive abstention" (Schattschneider, 1960:120).
But "passive abstention" is one thing; the more forceful
"boycott" of which he also speaks is something more
critical, in that it involves a more active withdrawal from
participation in the system, possibly on the basis of a decision that there is no real choice between the candidates
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or that the system can provide nothing for the individual.
It is at least a matter for debate and investigation, rather
than of cold fact, that the nonparticipation by such a
large segment of the population is purposeful, or that, as
Schattschneider suggested elsewhere, the nonparticipation
is purposely arranged by the active participants in the
political system. It is possible that such nonparticipation
is an unanticipated and unintended result of the behavior
of the active participants, rather than an anticipated and
intended one. Schattschneider also seemed to imply that
the non-voters are non-voters against their will, that they
are being manipulated. Although recent Negro registration drives in the South are changing the picture somewhat, it is possible that non-voters have done nothing to
protest their status as non-voters because they are unconcerned and do not feel deprived. This view is partially substantiated by McCiosky's (1964: 376) finding
that the disagreements of those who are unclear about
democratic ideals are "passive rather than active, more
the result of political ignorance and indifference than of
intellectual conviction or conscious identification with an
'alien' political tendency. Most seem not even to be aware
of their deviations from the established values." While
people can be manipulated without being aware of it, it
does not follow that the nonparticipants or the deprived
are ipso facto being manipulated.
A finding of Berelson's study, which is relevant to
Schattschneider's argument, is that there is agreement on
issues and rules of the game by the partisans of both parties. ( "Among those with opinions the partisans agree
on most issues, criteria, expectations, and rules of the
game." [Berelson et al., 1954: 309].) This does not necessarily mean, however, that there is a conspiracy of the
"ins" against the "outs," as Schattschneider suggested in
holding that there are in effect two communities, a political and a non-political ( or extra-political) one, within
the larger society.
lt may well be that the leaders of the participants take
advantage of non-voting, by doing little to involve the
non-voters beyond the usual "get-out-the-vote" attempts
at election time, and that usually they move to expand
the electorate when such expansion is to their own advantage. "It has been a matter of observation in the
United States and elsewhere that the extension of the
right to participate in selecting political leaders is often
produced less by the demands of the excluded than by
the manipulation of the party leaders" (Lane, 1959: 38,
citing Schattschneider, 1942: 48). But this action is
certainly not the same as purposely keeping the vote
away from a segment of the population large enough to
overwhelm the leaders; it is to the leaders' advantage to
court the non-voter, to keep him in mind. The power of
the potential voter is not measured by the number of
times the vote is exercised. If the potential voter is taken
into account, if the leaders of the politically active attempt to listen to "public opinion," then the non-voter
has some political influence even without exercising the
franchise. If, as Schattschneider held, the vote itself is
meaningless, then action taken on behalf of the non-voter
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may get him more than the vote itself. For the non-voters, virtual representation may, at certain times, provide
at least as much "pay-off" as direct representation.
Schattschneider talked about the difference between
"consent" and "support," maintaining that the former is
not sufficient to uphold the system. While non-voters may
exert a strong brake on political and social change, in
that account must be taken of them if the potential for
revolution is not to be created, they may provide support for the existing system simply by not working against
it and by defending it against attacks. Schattschneider
may have been asking for too much of a good thing; too
much participation might cause additional conflict and
exert an even more severe brake on action than now exists. In this connection, Berelson argued that high voting rates indicate high politicization of the society and a
highly politicized society relies so heavily on its political
subsystem for problem solving that the system's stability
may be threatened.
At any rate, Schattschneider presented little, if any,
evidence that the leaders of the politically active are able
to manipulate political nonparticipants. In addition, it is
not at all clear that the non-voters are outside the system,
or in a position to march in and take over. Many of
them are within the system (social and economic) and
possess quantities of the goods available within the system,
but they are in a state of flux or transition between different segments of the system. Relative satisfaction within
the economic and social subsystems may obviate participation in the political subsystem, particularly where, as
in the United States, politics is "marginal" and "lowkey." On the other hand, being at least minimally settled
in the society and economy, that is, possessing minimum
shelter, food, and protection, may be a prerequisite to
participation in the polity ( Davies, I 962). While the
minimum, in some absolute terms, may be possessed by
nearly all in America, in relative terms many are still
below the level that is defined for the society as "poverty." This condition and the acquisitive focus of much of
the society may cause individuals to spend a disproportionate amount of their time attempting to secure material goods, time that thus may be unavailable for political
participation.
While numbers of people in the society are alienated
from it, the non-voters of whom Berelson wrote are frequently within the system and are simply moving about :
to form new families, new community attachments, or to
move up ( or down) the socio-economic ladder. The upwardly mobile are certainly not disaffected with the society for they have accepted the values of higher strata
within the system and are moving toward them. Schattschneider pointed out that the voting studies showed the
non-voter as the "poorest" and "least educated" as well
as the "least well established" in the community. The
data Berelson provided suggest that some of those not
established, who provide flexibility in the outcomes of
elections, are often people moving from working to
middle, or from lower-middle to upper-middle, class
status, and are not simply the poorest or least educated.
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Such non-voters may be temporarily somewhat rootless
but are certainly quite committed to the values of the society and to the political system. In addition, some citizens are non-voters because they are highly satisfied with
the existing system rather than because of alienation from
it, or because they feel the country will do equally well
under either candidate (CampbeU, Gurin, and Miller,
I 954).
In addition, many of those who are socially and economically "out" do not mind ranking low in socio-economic status or do not feel deprived because of their objective position. If they held the same values and had the
same aims as those "above" them in the society, however, they would probably feel deprived. But Hyman
(I 953; also Lane, ] 963) has pointed out that the expectations of the so-called lower and working classes are different; their goals are less lofty than those of the middle
and upper classes - and this probably holds true even
given equal opportunity- although their "lower" aims
serve to reinforce their present position in the community. Schattschneider's statement and Berelson's finding
that the nonparticipants are of lower social standing is
somewhat questioned by Lane, with regard to local elections. The regular voters in these elections, he found, may
be less "desirable" than the nonparticipants, because, "In
these elections there may be some substance to the commonly expressed view that the highest participant group
is a machine-dominated clique working for its own advantage" (Lane, 1959:343). As a result, "Here, then,
is a situation where the political reserve consists of a different group, including more middle-class, better educated, 'civic minded' individuals." This finding does not
really directly challenge the Schattschneider-Berelson
findings but may require their limitation to national (and
perhaps state) elections.
While one of the major burdens of Schattschneider's
argument was that there are no issues meaningful to the
present non-voter, he also argued, and thereby partially
confused the argument, that technical factors may be responsible for low voting rates. He suggested that it is
good to pay attention to technical factors as well as to
the sociological and psychological ones. In a footnote, he
indicated that the British ballot is the size of a postcard
compared to our "bedsheets," and that we vote in many
elections for many more officials, including insignificant
ones. The technical factors with which Merriam and
Gosnell ( 1934) dealt, such as lack of residence required
for registration and inadequacy of absentee voter provisions, might thus be critical in establishing a pattern of
non-voting, at least for some potential voters.
Schattschneider assumed that the distribution of nonvoters is radically different from the distribution of voters, in terms of preference for particular policies. This
assumption was probably necessary to his argument that
simultaneous intervention in the political system by large
numbeFs of nonparticipants would be a "revolution." If
the distribution of preference among the non-voters is
not radically different from that among those who vote
regularly, then the intervention of the former might not
The Minnesota Academy of Science

make a significant difference in the compos1t1on of the
participant group. However, intervention by nonparticipants is not likely to be random or uniform among these
opinions; different segments will intervene at different
times. A parallel situation is pointed out by Key ( 1956:
143) : "the Democratic following consists in the main
of persons less disposed to vote than are Republicans;"
intervention of a small percentage of infrequently voting
Democrats in an election could produce a crucial difference in the resu lt. If the nonparticipants do differ in views
from the regular participants, excluding them may be a
greater danger than allowing them to enter the game;
participation itself will tend to socialize the newcomers:
Although the attitudes and interests of the groups
from which the newcomers to national politics may
come are out of harmony with the general values of a
tolerant democratic society, the risks to society of
withdrawal by these members of the political reserve
is greater than the risks of participation. The very act
of participation tends to create bonds of identification
between the participant and the society. ( Lane, 1959:
344)
However, one of my students has suggested that the nonvoters tend to support the political party in power, rather
than to oppose the system, and that they shift their preferences in line with shifts in occupancy of the White
House. He cited data (from Campbell, Converse, Stokes,
and Miller, 1960: 111) showing non-voters moving from
an 82 %-18 % Democratic preference in 1948 to a
72%-28% Republican preference eight years later. The
student then commented:
Preference of the non-voters in 1948 after 16 years
of Democratic administration was over four to one
Democratic Similarly, their preference in 1956 after
four years of Republican rule was nearly three to one
Republican. The non-voter, in other words, shows a
strong preference for the party in power.
It would seem to me that if the non-voter felt that
the system was loaded against him, he would show his
displeasure for the party then in power. At least, I
would not expect him to show overwhelming support
for the party presently symbolizing the system (Jacobson, 1964).
One or two additional points ought to be made about
Schattschneider's argument. He called for a politics based
on "something new." Yet, whatever the new issues, they
might be presented in the same way that older and (for
Schattschneider) inadequate issues have been presented.
Perhaps it was the way the issues are presented that disturbed Schattschneider. Yet he was by no means clear
which of the two alternatives (new issues or new manner of presentation) would provide the solution to the
problem posed, or, if each would, which would be the
more effective. Despite this lack of clarity, Schattschneider's point about the need for something new seems to
have its validity. "The more salient and clear-cut the issue, the more likely that a group will react in terms of
its defined interest" (Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and
Linz, 1954: 1170). And the ambiguousness of democratic politics means that issues are not frequently preJournal of, Volume Thirty-three, No. 2, 1966

sented in a salient and clear-cut" manner. if they are
not, then it is unlikely that even part of the non-voters
can be moved from their present habit of nonparticipation. "A sharp break in a traditional continuity by a
sub-group can occur only when some experience is perceived as clearly affecting their interests and requiring a
new political organization" (Lipset et al., 1954: 1170).
In addition, emphasis only on increasing the proportion
of those voting, without attention to other types of participation or the quality of participation, seems inadequate.
Voting, because it is minimal political participation, does
not necessarily mean involvement in the system, but may
take place out of force of habit, which is certainly not the
same as the involvement Schattschneider said is needed.
Therefore, lowering barriers to participation in voting
would not necessarily produce a change in the character
or quality of participation. More certainly, the solution
is needed to problems of non-participation in our political system.
Let us now turn our attention somewhat more directly
to Berelson. First of all, his position concerning the positive functions of lower participation, while perhaps representative of the thinking of some students of political
behavior, is not representative of the dominant view in
the population at large. From the point of view of the
classical model of democracy, the least (politically) educated ( our "nonparticipants") should not vote. Children
are taught in schools that the good citizen should be an
aware and informed one, and my college students suggest frequently, and not unrepresentatively, that one
should not vote unless he is informed.
As stated by Lane, "It certainly is not clear that increased participation without an appropriate background
of interest and involvement benefits either the participant
himself or the society of which he is a member" (1959:
343). That many of those who do not fit the model, do
not in fact participate in the system, may be functional
for the system and may continue to reinforce the model
for many people.
Democratic viability is . . . saved by the fact that
those who are most confused about democratic ideas
are so likely to be politicaIJy apathetics and without
significant influence . . .
Apathy also furnishes its own partial corrective by
keeping the doubters from acting upon their differences ( McClosky, 1964: 3 7 6).
However, this was not the burden of Berclson's argument, as we have pointed out in our earlier summary of
his position.
For Berelson, an amount of non participation was an indication, and a good one, that the society is not fully politicized, that other ways of problem solving beside the political exist ( although problems may still go unsolved),
and that therefore the political system is not burdened
with having to solve all of society's problems. The converse might be indicated by a high rate of voting. However, the meaninglessness of the voting act for the individual voter weakens the force of his argument. If "for
the bulk of the American people the voting decision is
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not followed by any direct, immediate, visible personal
consequences" (Berelson et al., 1954:314-5), and if the
voting act is not very meaningful under present conditions, then an increase in the voting rate, even a substantial one, would not per se mean full politicization of the
society or increased reliance on the po1ity for the solution of the society's problems.
While Schattschneider seemed unclear what weight to
give technical factors as a cause of non-voting, Berelson
clearly ignored them. His interpretation of non-voting
may have been biased because of failure to evaluate technical reasons for non-voting as well as socio-economic
correlates of non-voting. If people cannot vote because
they do not fulfill certain legal requirements, they are not
very likely to have any interest in the election; it would
be interest invested to little avail. It may be that those
of lower socio-economic status are less involved politically and might thus be less likely to vote even if registered, or if eligible to register, but this is hypothesis, not
finding. Berelson, however, did state that the complexity
of polrtical problems ( which might be taken to inciude
such things as the long ballot) is relevant to the voting
decision, but he suggested that it only changes the determinants of voting instead of producing non-voting.
Increasing nationalization of politics in America raises
a serious question of the requirements of the theory of
democracy. Classical theories of democracy, with their
emphasis on rational discussion and debate, were based
on the small community. just as Berelson's study was
based on one city. In our system, grossly larger than the
Greek city-state, we have provided some substitutes for
face-to-face communication across vast geographic expanses, but we have provided very few substitutes for
continuous feedback and interchange that debate and discussion provide. Berelson's attention to the single community may obscure some of this. Yet even at the local
level, the changes in the structure of our life situation
have altered the form and substance of political communication. And, when we do communicate, we talk, not
debate. "On the grass roots level there was more talk
than debate . . . " (Berelson et al., 1954:308). If we
do not debate even on the local level, we are not likely to
be able to do so on the national level, except perhaps
for such special events as the extremely stylized debates
between Kennedy and Nixon or through interchanges
between syndicated columnists.
Berelson did not deal explicitly with methods for providing more effective communication, yet his data pointed
to a way in which the requirement of rationality within
the political system might be partially, although indirectly, satisfied. While political preferences are "relatively invulnerable to direct argumentation," they are "vulnerable
to indirect social influences" (Bcrelsonet al., 1954:311).
The specific requirement of rational discussion ( or "debate") may not be fulfilled, or what debate occurs may
have little effect, but the "wilder" ideas may be filtered
out because they do not get enough acceptance to be socially reinforced. This can reduce the amount of trialand-error necessary in policy-making or in political decision-making generally . The members of the polity may
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be somewhat protected from manipulation by this requirement that "indirect social influences" operate before an idea will be accepted, because the elites then cannot easily manipulate isolated individuals. New alternatives must receive acceptance among (large) numbers of
people before they can become the basis for action. An
idea is less likely to be reinforced by the social environment if only one in every two hundred people holds it
than if one in every 20 do; the more frequent contact
between people with the same idea in the latter condition
may start a spiral of acceptance. What this means is that
the threshold for acceptance of new alternatives is higher
than if political preferences changed solely in response
to direct argument, but once this threshold is reached,
the alternative may become more firmly implanted and
thus more resistant to change in the short run.
Berelson and Schattschneider agreed that there has
been an overestimation by classical democratic theorists
of the abilities and contributions by the individual, but
disagree as to who will supply these deficiences. Schattschneider wrote, "All classical concepts of democracy
have overestimated the strength and universality of the
self-generated impulse of people to participate in the life
of the political community" ( 1960: 111). Somewhat differently, Berelson stated, "Individual voters today seem
unable to satisfy the requirements for a democratic system of government outlined by political theorists" (Berelson et al., 1954: 312). Perhaps the biggest question raised
concerning the theory of democracy by these two statements is, "Where will the burden for success of the democratic system rest?"
Berelson devoted much of his analysis to this point.
He said that classical theory demanded too much of the
individual voter and suggested that the system as a whole
bear the burden, with individuals taken collectively fulfilling requirements that none ( or few) could fulfill individually. But his general argument did not remove the
burden of fulfilling the requirements; instead, it shifted
them, and, while answering one set of questions, posed
and left unanswered a second set. He seemed to shift the
burden from the individual citizen to ( 1) the non-voter
and (2) the opinion leader. While high politicization and
constant demands on the political system to solve the society's problems may tear the system apart if the demands are continued for long times, and while the less
involved or uninvolved voter may provide short-run flexibility, Berelson was not clear on what is to happen when
either sudden demands or constant demands deriving
from crisis situations are made upon the system. If the
individual voter does not fulfill classical democratic
norms, and the uninvolved voter provides short-run flexibility, who is to provide strength over the long run? If
people can be involved in the political system with only
the difficulty that Berelson seemed to suggest ( with the
need for reinforcement from primary groups), where is
the reserve that may be needed? Even if one grants, with
Bcrelson, that the existence of numbers of non-voters
provides slack to be taken up during periods of crisis,
what happens when the slack is taken up completely?
f have referred to the "short-run" flexibility provided
The Minnesota Academy of Science

by the relatively uninvolved potential elector. He can
move with certain of the demands placed on the society.
Berelson, however, did not fully suggest what happens to
these people in the long run. Without doubt, some of
them do put down roots, in new communities, in new
socio-economic strata, and with this, their vote stabilizes.
Some may be temporary "defectors," who will return to
the fold in the next election. But some may become permanent "shifters," always vacillating. When decisive action is required, these may contribute to instability rather
than to stability. Theory must be concerned with the
long-run continuance of the democratic system, as well
as with its short-run maintenance.
In addition to placing the burden of operation of the
democratic system on the uninvolved citizen, Berelson
also counted heavily on the opinion leader for the system's success. This is the individual who most closely
meets the requirements established by democratic theory:
'The classical requirements are more appropriate for the
opinion leaders in the society, but even they do not meet
them directly" (Berelson et al., 1954: 322-3). The system depends on the opinion leaders, a set of individuals
far smaller than the total potential electorate, for the
transmission of ideas, for the filtering of communications
transmitted by the candidates and office-holders, and for
the reinforcement of ideas, particularly the latter (Key,
1961 :51-3). The existence of these individuals provides
a prop to classical theory; the existence of rational types
who appear to approximate the older definition of "independent voter" ( with their ability to communicate and
rationalize so that they appear to delay voting decisions
until the last moment) makes it difficult for many to see
that the formal theory of democracy and its practice diverge considerably.
Classical democratic theory at least had the virtue of
relying on all men in the community because it assumed
that "there is such a thing as 'the' typical citizen on whom
uniform requirements can be imposed," and that most
citizens were typical. Berelson, by placing the burden on
the opinion leader, in effect leaves democracy at the
mercy of a much smaller number of individuals. If they
fail in their functions of communication, filtering, and
reinforcement, finding their replacements will be extremely difficult.
Summary

In brief, my main criticisms of the two approaches to
the subject of nonvoting are as follows: It remains to be
proved that non-voters are such against their will or that
they are manipulated by the existing elite. That a large
number of people are habitual non-voters does not necessarily indicate the existence of a separate non- or extra-political community, cut off from the political community. Even those who do not participate may provide
support for the political system. Not all the non-participants are found in the lowest strata in the community,
nor do they have political values totally different from
those of the more regular participants. Geographical and
soda! mobility, caused in part by our society's prosperity, may be an important factor in causing non-voting.

Journal of, Volume Thirty-three, No. 2, 1966

A high rate of voting does not necessarily mean high
politicization if the voting act itself is relatively meaningless or is only minimal political participation. Agreement
that classical democratic theory has overemphasized the
role of the individual "ideal-typical" citizen shifts the
burden of support from the average citizen either to the
less motivated, less-well-educated individual, or to the
relatively smaH number of opinion leaders who are our
closest approximation of the democratic ideal. While
short-run flexibility may be provided by the relatively uninvolved, problems of long-run strength of the system
still remain to be solved.
Perhaps the most brief and direct statement upon
which I can end this critique is this: more research is
needed into non-voting - perhaps the examination of
some of the points suggested here. However, with or
without this research, we need to devote more thought
to restatements of democratic theory so that the goals
theory establishes will be felt to be possible of attainment. In this restatement, we must continue to try to
adopt the classical democratic theory of the city-state
to the grossly larger and more complex environment in
which we now find ourselves, a setting that requires, as
a result of the Industrial Revolution, a much more involved set of equipment, if it is to be operated properly.
Non-voting is not a problem to be dismissed; we must
at least make certain that the citizen "does have the potential to act if there is need" (Almond and Verba,
1963 :481), even if we do not require him to be "constantly involved in politics" or actively "to oversee the
behavior of political decision makers."
Political functions must be performed, and we want
them performed well; therefore, we must see to it that
even if each and every citizen is not equipped to play
all requisite political roles, enough citizens play each
role so that, through a highly interrelated system, our political work is accomplished.
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